Cross-Layer Scheduling in Multi-user System with Delay and Secrecy
  Constraints by Wang, Jun et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
21
0.
11
39
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
16
 A
ug
 20
13
1
Cross-Layer Scheduling in Multi-User System
with Delay and Secrecy Constraints
Jun Wang, Pengfei Huang, and Xudong Wang
Abstract
Recently, physical layer security based approaches have drawn considerable attentions and are
envisaged to provide secure communications in the wireless networks. However, most existing literatures
only focus on the physical layer. Thus, how to design an effective transmission scheme which also
considers the requirements from the upper layers is still an unsolved problem. We consider such cross-
layer resource allocation problem in the multi-user downlink environment for both having instantaneous
and partial eavesdropping channel information scenarios. The problem is first formulated in a new
security framework. Then, the control scheme is designed to maximize the average admission rate of
the data, incorporating delay, power, and secrecy as constraints, for both non-colluding and colluding
eavesdropping cases in each scenario. Performance analysis is given based on the stochastic optimization
theory and the simulations are carried out to validate the effectiveness of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical layer security has drawn considerable interests, and is expected to provide secure
communications in the wireless networks. Physical layer security dates back to the Shannon’s notion of
perfect security [1], and then it is studied in [2] [3] [4]. They show that secure communication is possible
if the legitimate receiver has a better channel than the eavesdropper. The impact of channel fading is
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2lately considered very helpful that perfect secrecy can be achieved even when the eavesdropping channel
is stronger than the legitimate channel on average [5] [6] [7].
So far many progresses are made to enhance the secrecy with the advanced physical layer tech-
nologies. One of these is to employ beamforming to strengthen the quality of the legitimate link in the
multi-antenna systems. In [8], beamforming is proved to be the optimal strategy for secrecy in the MISO
system. Then, the robust power allocation to maximize the secrecy rate for the MISO system is studied
in [9] and [10]. To further improve the secrecy, artificial noise is used to degrade the eavesdropping
channel [11]. Based on [11], beamforming and artificial noise are shown to evidently improve secrecy
in the MIMO-OFDM system [12]. In [13], an optimization problem is investigated, which aims to
minimize the total power consumption on both data and artificial noise to satisfy the minimum SNR at
the legitimate user and a given average SNR at each eavesdropper. In [14], an analytical closed-form
of the ergodic secrecy capacity of a single legitimate link in the presence of some eavesdroppers is
calculated, and then the optimal power allocation between the data and artificial noise is also derived.
More recently, in contrast to the secrecy outage formulated in [5], a new formulation which can depict
reliability and security separately is proposed in [15]. Under this new framework, the benefits of the
multiple transmitting antennas are investigated in [16].
However, most efforts are made only in the physical layer. Thus, the interaction between the secrecy
requirement in the physical layer and other QoS requirements (e.g., delay) in the upper layers of the
wireless networks has not been sufficiently understood. So far a few papers have been published to
solve this problem under the stochastic optimization framework (The stochastic optimization tool is
used widely as in [17], [18], and [19]). In [20], a single hop uplink scenario is considered, where each
node is controlled to send messages securely from other nodes with the objective of maximizing an
overall utility. In [21], under a point to point secure communication scenario, the scheduling of the data,
which is protected by either the physical layer security coding or the secret key, is investigated. In [22],
the broadcast channel model is considered, and the arrival rate supported by the fading wiretap channel
is analyzed and the power allocation policy is derived.
In this paper, we consider a different problem from above papers. First, we focus on the multi-user
downlink scenario like [23], and adopt a new security framework which can describe reliability and
security separately, thus providing insight on the cross-layer resource allocation problem. Second, we
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3adopt beamforming and artificial noise as the physical layer technique. Then, a cross-layer power control
scheme is carefully designed for both the total power allocation and the power ratio between the data and
artificial noise, jointly considering delay, secrecy, energy consumption and multiuser diversity. Third,
we focus on two scenarios. One is the sender has instantaneous eavesdropping channel information.
The other one is that the sender only has partial eavesdropping channel information. In each scenario,
both non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping cases are discussed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system model is given in Section II. The
optimization problem is formulated in Section III. The control scheme and the performance analysis
are presented in Section IV. Simulation results are given in Section V and the paper is concluded in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the secure communication between a transmitter (Alice) and K legitimate receivers
(i.e., K Bobs) in the presence of NE eavesdroppers (Eves), as shown in Fig. 1. Like [23], the transmitter
Alice is equipped with NA antennas and each legitimate receiver Bob has one antenna. The time is
considered slotted. At each time slot, the transmitter sends information to a single receiver based on the
time division multiple access (TDMA) scheme. In addition, each Eve is equipped with a single antenna.
Non-colluding and colluding cases are considered. In the former case, each Eve individually decodes
the intercepted information. While in the later case, NE Eves jointly process their received information
and we assume NA > NE as same as in [14].
We assume all the wireless links experience Rayleigh block fading. The channel gain varies from
one time slot to another independently. In each time slot, the channel gain remains stable. During time
slot t, we define hi(t) as the 1×NA channel gain vector between Alice and Bob i (i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}), and
its element is distributed as CN (0, 1). gj(t) is the 1×NA channel gain vector between Alice and Eve j
(j ∈ {1, . . . , NE}), and its element is distributed as CN (0, 1). G(t) is the NE×NA channel gain matrix
between Alice and colluding NE eavesdroppers. Each element is distributed as CN (0, 1). w is additive
white Gaussian noise with distribution CN (0, σ2w). w represents NE × 1 additive white Gaussian noise
vector at NE colluding Eves and its distribution is CN (0, Iσ2w). Without loss of generality, the noise is
normalized with unit variance (σ2w = 1).
We assume Alice can accurately obtain the instantaneous channel information between Alice and
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Fig. 1. System model
all K legitimate users. However, for the eavesdroppers, we consider two scenarios. The first scenario
is that Alice can obtain the instantaneous eavesdropping channel information. The second scenario is
that Alice only has partial information about the eavesdropping channel. More specifically, we assume
Alice knows the number of Eves and the eavesdropping channel exhibiting Rayleigh fading, but Alice
can not obtain the instantaneous eavesdropping channel gains. In each scenario, both non-colluding and
colluding cases are considered.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, a cross-layer problem is formulated. In the physical layer, the beamforming and
the artificial noise are used to secure the data. While in the upper layer, the data queue of each user is
required to be stable. We jointly consider the requirements from different layers as follows.
A. Channel Capacity with Beamforming and Artificial Noise
Beamforming and artificial noise are used as the physical layer technique to improve secrecy [11]
[14], and it is described as follows. At time slot t, Alice generates an NA × NA matrix Z(t) =
[z1(t) Z2(t)], where z1(t) = h
∗(t)
||h(t)|| and Z2(t) is the null space matrix of h(t). The NA × 1 transmitted
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5symbol vector by Alice is given as x(t) = z1(t)u(t) + Z2(t)v(t). The variance of u(t) is σ2u(t) and
each element of the (NA − 1) × 1 vector v(t) has circular symmetric complex Gaussian distribution
with variance σ2v(t). u(t) and v(t) represent data and artificial noise, respectively. The total power for
the data and artificial noise is P (t). Thus, P (t) = σ2u(t) + (NA − 1)σ2v(t). We denote the fraction of
the total power allocated to the data is ε(t). Therefore, σ2u(t) = ε(t)P (t) and σ2v(t) =
(1−ε(t))P (t)
NA−1
.
The legitimate channel between Alice and Bob i is
ybi(t) = hi(t)x(t) + w
= hi(t)z1(t)u(t) + hi(t)Z2(t)v(t) + w
= ||hi(t)||2u(t) + w.
(1)
The corresponding capacity of the legitimate channel between Alice and Bob i is a function of the
control parameters P (t) and ε(t), and is denoted as Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t))
Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t)) = log2(1 + σ
2
u(t)||hi(t)||2/σ2w)
= log2(1 + ε(t)P (t)||hi(t)||2).
(2)
In the non-colluding case, the eavesdropping channel between Alice and Eve j is modeled as
yej(t) = gj(t)x(t) + w
= gj(t)z1(t)u(t) + gj(t)Z2(t)v(t) + w.
(3)
The corresponding capacity of the eavesdropping channel between Alice and Eve j is denoted as
Cej(t, P (t), ε(t))
Cej(t, P (t), ε(t))
=log2(1 +
|gj(t)z1(t)|2σ2u(t)(
gj(t)Z2(t)Z∗2(t)g∗j (t)
)
σ2v(t) + σ
2
w
).
(4)
Similarly, in the colluding case, the eavesdropping channel between Alice and colluding Eves is
yeves(t) =G(t)x(t) + w
=G(t)z1(t)u(t) + G(t)Z2(t)v(t) + w.
=g¯1(t)u(t) + G¯2(t)v(t) + w,
(5)
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6where g¯1(t) = G(t)z1(t) and G¯2(t) = G(t)Z2(t). The corresponding capacity of the eavesdropping
channel between Alice and the colluding Eves is denoted as Ceves(t, P (t), ε(t))
Ceves(t, P (t), ε(t))
=log2(
|G¯2(t)G¯
∗
2(t)σ
2
v(t) + Iσ2w + g¯1(t)g¯∗1(t)σ2u(t)|
|G¯2(t)G¯
∗
2(t)σ
2
v(t) + Iσ2w|
).
(6)
B. New Formulation of the Secrecy
We consider a new security framework which can depict reliability and security separately as
proposed in [15]. For the secure communication between Alice and Bob i, Alice chooses two rates.
The rate of the transmitted codewords Rbi(t) and the rate of the confidential information Rsi(t).
Re(t) = Rbi(t) − Rsi(t) reflects the cost of securing the messages against the eavesdropping. For
each transmission, Bob i can decode correctly if Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t)) > Rbi(t). While perfect secrecy fails
if the eavesdropping channel capacity Ce(t) is larger than Re(t). The secrecy outage probability Pso is
defined as in [15]
Pso = P
(
Ce(t) > Re(t)|message transmission
)
. (7)
Thus, the reliability (Rbi(t)) and security (Re(t)) can be considered in (2) and (7), separately.
1) Instantaneous Eavesdropping Channel Information Scenario: We assume we can
obtain the instantaneous eavesdropping channel information of all NE eavesdroppers. Thus, we can
achieve perfect secrecy, i.e., Pso = 0. For the secure communication between Alice and Bob i,
the secrecy rate at time slot t is a function of the control parameters P (t) and ε(t), denoted as
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t)). For both non-colluding and colluding cases, Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t)) can be calculated as
follows
• Non-colluding case
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t)) =[Rbi(t)−Re(t)]
+
=[Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t))− max
j∈{1,2,...,NE}
Cej(t, P (t), ε(t))]
+,
(8)
where [a]+ is max[a, 0].
• Colluding case
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t)) =[Rbi(t)−Re(t)]
+
=[Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t)) − Ceves(t, P (t), ε(t))]
+.
(9)
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72) Partial Eavesdropping Channel Information Scenario: Since we can not obtain the
instantaneous eavesdropping channel state, it results in: 1) whether message is transmitted is independent
from the current eavesdropping channel state, i.e., (7) is converted into the unconditional probability:
Pso = P
(
Ce(t) > Re(t)
)
; 2) the perfect secrecy can not be guaranteed. Thus, we focus on designing
the transmission scheme such that the secrecy outage Pso can satisfy certain secure level η. For the
communication between Alice and Bob i, the secrecy rate Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) at time slot t for non-
colluding and colluding cases are derived as follows.
• Non-colluding case
For NE non-colluding eavesdroppers, the secrecy outage Pso is expressed as 1−[P(Cej(t, P (t), ε(t)) <
Re(t))]
NE
. Since the detailed distribution of Cej(t, P (t), ε(t)) is complex, we consider the worst
case that the SNR at the eavesdropper is very high so that σ2w is negligible compared to the
artificial noise. By omitting σ2w in (4), we obtain the upper bound of Cej(t, P (t), ε(t)), denoted
as Cupej (t, ε(t)),
Cupej (t, ε(t))
=log2(1 +
|gj(t)z1(t)|2σ2u(t)(
gj(t)Z2(t)Z∗2(t)g∗j (t)
)
σ2v(t)
)
=log2(1 +
|gj(t)z1(t)|2(NA − 1)ε(t)(
gj(t)Z2(t)Z∗2(t)g∗j (t)
)
(1− ε(t))
),
(10)
where |gj(t)z1(t)|
2(NA−1)
gj(t)Z2(t)Z∗2(t)g∗j (t)
has a distribution as F-distribution with parameter (2, 2NA − 2), and its
probability density function is f(x) = (NA−1)
NA
(x+NA−1)NA
[14].
Thus, to ensure that Pso satisfy secure level η, we let Pupso (i.e., 1−
[
P
(
Cupej (t, ε(t)) < Re(t)
)]NE )
satisfy the secrecy outage requirement, where P
(
Cupej (t, ε(t)) < Re(t)
)
is calculated as follows
P
(
Cupej (t, ε(t)) < Re(t)
)
=P
(
log2(1 +
ε(t)
1− ε(t)
x) < Re(t)
)
=P
(
x < (2Re(t) − 1)
1− ε(t)
ε(t)
)
=− (NA − 1)
NA−1(x+NA − 1)
1−NA + 1|
x=(2Re(t)−1) 1−ε(t)
ε(t)
=− (NA − 1)
NA−1((2Re(t) − 1)
1− ε(t)
ε(t)
+NA − 1)
1−NA + 1.
(11)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus ε(t) for the non-colluding case in partial eavesdropping channel information scenario
when NA = 6 and NE = 3.
For secure level η, let Pupso = η, so the relationship between Re(t) and ε(t) is
− (NA − 1)
NA−1((2Re(t) − 1)
1− ε(t)
ε(t)
+NA − 1)
1−NA
=(1− η)
1
NE − 1.
(12)
When NA = 6 and NE = 3, the relationship between Re(t) and ε(t) is shown in Fig. 2. Since
Re(t) is determined by ε(t) and η, Re(t) is denoted as Re(t, ε(t), η). Thus, the secrecy rate
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) is determined as follows.
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)
=[Rbi(t)−Re(t)]
+
=[Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t)) −Re(t, ε(t), η)]
+,
(13)
where Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t)) is calculated by (2), and Re(t, ε(t), η) is computed by (12).
• Colluding case
Similar to the non-colluding case, for NE colluding Eves, the secrecy outage Pso can be expressed
as P
(
Ceves(t, P (t), ε(t)) > Re(t)
)
. We obtain the upper bound of Ceves(t, P (t), ε(t)), denoted as
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9Cupeves(t, ε(t)), by omitting σ2w in (6),
Cupeves(t, ε(t))
=log2
∣∣I + σ2u(t)g¯1(t)g¯∗1(t)
(
σ2v(t)G¯2(t)G¯
∗
2(t)
)−1∣∣
=log2
(
1 +
NA − 1
ε(t)−1 − 1
g¯∗1(t)
(
G¯2(t)G¯
∗
2(t)
)−1g¯1(t)
)
,
(14)
where g¯∗1(t)(G¯2(t)G¯
∗
2(t))
−1g¯1(t) has a distribution that its complementary cumulative distribution
function is F c(x) =
∑NE−1
k=0 (
NA−1
k )x
k
(1+x)NA−1
[14].
Thus, to ensure that Pso satisfy secure level η, we let Pupso
(
i.e., P
(
Cupeves(t, ε(t)) > Re(t)
))
satisfy
this secrecy outage requirement,
Pupso =P(C
up
eves(t) > Re(t))
=P(Cupeves(t) > Re(t))
=P(log2(1 +
NA − 1
ε(t)−1 − 1
x) > Re(t))
=P(x > (2Re(t) − 1)
ε(t)−1 − 1
NA − 1
)
=
∑NE−1
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
xk
(1 + x)NA−1
|
x=(2Re(t)−1) ε(t)
−1
−1
NA−1
=
∑NE−1
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
xk
(1 + (2Re(t) − 1) ε(t)
−1−1
NA−1
)NA−1
.
(15)
For secure level η, let Pupso = η, so the relationship between Re(t) and ε(t) is
∑NE−1
k=0
(
NA−1
k
)
xk
(1 + (2Re(t) − 1) ε(t)
−1−1
NA−1
)NA−1
= η. (16)
For NA = 6 and NE = 3, the relationship between Re(t) and ε(t) is shown in Fig. 3. Since
Re(t) is determined by ε(t) and η, Re(t) is denoted as Re(t, ε(t), η). Thus, the secrecy rate
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) is determined as follows
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) =[Rbi(t)−Re(t)]
+
=[Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t))−Re(t, ε(t), η)]
+,
(17)
where Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t)) is calculated by (2), and Re(t, ε(t), η) is computed by (16).
In the partial eavesdropping channel information scenario, for both non-colluding and colluding
cases, when ε(t) = 0, i.e., no data is transmitted, Re(t, ε(t), η) is defined as 0 for any η. Thus,
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) = 0. When ε(t) = 1, i.e., no artificial noise is generated, Re(t, ε(t), η) is defined
as +∞ for any η. Thus, Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) = 0.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus ε(t) for the colluding case in partial eavesdropping channel information scenario
when NA = 6 and NE = 3.
C. Upper Layer Data Queue Process
In the upper layer, the data queue process is considered. For user i (i = 1, . . . ,K) at time slot t,
let Ai(t) denote the data arrival process, and it is bounded by Amax. Only Ri(t) of Ai(t) are admitted
into the data queue Ui(t) in order to keep the data queue stable. At time slot t, only one user i is served
with rate Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η), which is related to the secrecy outage requirement η, the total power
P (t) and power ratio ε(t). Data queue Ui(t) is updated as follows
Ui(t+ 1) = max[Ui(t)−Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t), 0] +Ri(t), (18)
where Ii(t) is an indicator. If Ii(t) = 1, it means user i is chosen for transmission at time slot t.
D. Optimization Problem Formualtion
We consider the optimization problem incorporating both the physical layer and upper layer. Let ri
denote the long term average admission rate of the data for user i, i.e., ri = limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 E{Ri(t)}.
Let {θ1, θ2, . . . , θK} be a collection of positive weights. Our objective is to maximize the sum of
weighted average admission rate under the average power, secrecy and queue stability constraints. The
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11
optimization problem can be formulated as follows
Maximize
K∑
i=1
θiri
s.t.
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Ui(t) ≤ +∞, i = 1, . . . ,K, (19)
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
P (t) ≤ Pav, (20)
0 ≤ Ri(t) ≤ Ai(t), i = 1, . . . ,K, (21)
P (t) ∈ Π, ε(t) ∈ Λ,Pso ≤ η. (22)
In the above constraints, (19) requires the data queue to be stable. (20) describes the average power
constraint. (21) shows that the admitted data is less than the arrival data. (22) means the selection set
for total power P (t) is Π, the selection set for power ratio ε(t) is Λ, and the secrecy outage constraint
is η.
Similar to [18] [19], to satisfy the average power constraint, a virtual power queue X(t) is defined.
It is updated as follows
X(t+ 1) = max[X(t)− Pav, 0] + P (t). (23)
IV. CONTROL SCHEME AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the control scheme and also give the performance analysis, using the
stochastic optimization tool.
A. Cross-layer Control Scheme
1. Admission control:
Minimize
K∑
i=1
(Ui(t)− V θi)Ri(t),
0 ≤ Ri(t) ≤ Ai(t).
August 3, 2018 DRAFT
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2. Power allocation:
Maximize
K∑
i=1
Ui(t)Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)−X(t)P (t),
P (t) ∈ Π, ε(t) ∈ Λ,Pso ≤ η,
where the secrecy rate Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) is calculated differently under different conditions. When in
the scenario that the instantaneous eavesdropping channel information is available, perfect secrecy (i.e.,
η = 0) can be achieved. Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) are calculated according to (8) and (9) for non-colluding and
colluding cases, respectively. When in the scenario that only partial eavesdropping channel information
is available, a non-zero secrecy outage requirement η can be satisfied. Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) are calculated
according to (13) and (17) for non-colluding and colluding cases, respectively.
3. Queue update:
The data queue Ui(t) and the virtual power queue X(t) are updated according to (18) and (23),
respectively.
Control scheme proof:
The proof is similar to [18] [19]. We define Q(t) as a vector of all queues Q(t) = (U1(t), . . . , UK(t), X(t)).
The Lyapunov function of the queue Q(t) is L(Q(t)) = 12 [
∑K
i=1 U
2
i (t)+X
2(t)]. The Lyapunov drift of
the queue Q(t) is L(Q(t+1))−L(Q(t)) = 12 [
∑K
i=1 U
2
i (t+1)+X
2(t+1)]− 12 [
∑K
i=1 U
2
i (t)+X
2(t)],
where
U2i (t+ 1)− U
2
i (t) ≤U
2
i (t) +R
2
i (t) +
(
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)2
+
2Ui(t)
(
Ri(t)−Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)
− U2i (t)
=R2i (t) +
(
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)2
+ 2Ui(t)
(
Ri(t)−Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)
,
X2(t+ 1)−X2(t) ≤ X2(t) + P 2(t) + P 2av + 2X(t)
(
P (t)− Pav(t)
)
−X2(t)
=P 2(t) + P 2av + 2X(t)
(
P (t)− Pav(t)
)
.
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The one time slot conditional Lyapunov drift of Q(t) is ∆(Q(t)),
∆(Q(t)) =E{L(Q(t+ 1))− L(Q(t))|Q(t)}
≤E{
1
2
K∑
i=1
[R2i (t) +
(
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)2
+ 2Ui(t)
(
Ri(t)−Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)
]+
1
2
[P 2(t) + P 2av + 2X(t)
(
P (t)− Pav(t)
)
]|Q(t)}
≤B + C + E{
K∑
n=1
Ui(t)
(
Ri(t)−Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)
|Q(t)}+
E{X(t)
(
P (t)− Pav(t)
)
|Q(t)},
Where B = KA
2
max+Rs
2
max
2 . Arrival data process Ai(t) is bounded, so let Amax be a constant that
Amax ≥ Ai(t) for all i and t. In the real environment, the transmission power P (t) is finite, and
the channel gain |h|2 is bounded by a sufficiently large constant |h|2max. Let Rsmax be a constant
that Rsmax ≥ Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t) for all i, t, P (t), ε(t), η, and channel states. Thus, B ≥
1
2
∑K
i=1[R
2
i (t) +
(
Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)2
]. C =
P 2max+P
2
av
2 , Pmax ≥ P (t) for all t. Thus, C ≥
1
2 [P
2(t) + P 2av].
According to the stochastic optimization theory, the original optimization problem in Section III-D
can be solved by minimizing the following drift-plus-penalty expression:
Minimize ∆(Q(t))− V E{
K∑
i=1
θiRi(t)|Q(t)}
=E{L(Q(t+ 1))− L(Q(t))|Q(t)} − V E{
K∑
i=1
θiRi(t)|Q(t)}
≤B + C + E{
K∑
i=1
Ui(t)
(
Ri(t)−Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)
|Q(t)}+
E{X(t)
(
P (t)− Pav
)
|Q(t)} − V E{
K∑
i=1
θiRi(t)|Q(t)}
=B + C − E{X(t)Pav|Q(t)} + E{
K∑
i=1
(Ui(t)− V θi)Ri(t)|Q(t)}+
E{X(t)P (t)−
K∑
i=1
Ui(t)Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)|Q(t)}
Thus, to minimize ∆(Q(t)) − V E{
∑K
i=1 θiRi(t)|Q(t)} is equal to minimizing
∑K
i=1(Ui(t) −
V θi)Ri(t) and X(t)P (t)−
∑K
i=1 Ui(t)Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t) in every time slot t.
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B. Performance Analysis
1. For user i, its data queue Ui(t) is upper bounded by a constant Umaxi for all t: Ui(t) ≤ Umaxi =
V θi +Amax.
Proof : The proof is similar as in [18] [19]. For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, when t = 0, all queues are
initialized to 0. Thus, Ui(0) ≤ Umaxi is satisfied. Assume that Ui(t) ≤ Umaxi for any time slot t. For
time slot t + 1, we need to consider two cases. 1) If Ui(t) ≤ Umaxi − Amax, we have Ui(t + 1) ≤
Ui(t) + Ri(t) ≤ Umaxi − Amax + Ri(t) ≤ U
max
i . 2) If Ui(t) ≥ Umaxi − Amax, then Ui(t) ≥ V θi +
Amax−Amax = V θi. Thus, according to the control scheme, no data is admitted, i.e., Ui(t+1) ≤ Umaxi .
Thus, when parameter V is small, the queue length is short (i.e., small queuing delay). For
queuing delay requirement Di of each user i in the system, the parameter V can be chosen as
Mini∈{1,2,...,K}(Di −Amax)/θi.
2. The virtual power queue X(t) is bounded by a constant Xmax for all t: X(t) ≤ Xmax = γUmax+
Pmax = γV θmax + γAmax + Pmax, where Umax = maxi∈{1,2,...,K}Umaxi , θmax = maxi∈{1,2,...,K}θi,
and γ is any constant that satisfies Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) ≤ γP (t) over all i, t, P (t), ε(t), η, and channel
states.
Proof : The proof is similar as in [18] [19]. There exists a finite γ that Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η) ≤ γP (t),
e.g., γ can be chosen as the maximum directional derivative of Cbi(t, P (t), ε(t)) with respect to P (t),
maximized over all users, ε(t) and channel states. When X(t) ≥ γUmax, the following holds
K∑
i=1
Ui(t)Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)−X(t)P (t)
≤
K∑
i=1
Ui(t)Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)− γUmaxP (t)
≤
K∑
i=1
Ui(t)γP (t)Ii(t)− γUmaxP (t)
≤0.
The maximum 0 is achieved when P (t) = 0. Therefore, when X(t) ≥ γUmax, X(t) will not further
increase. Thus, X(t) ≤ γUmax + Pmax = γV θmax + γAmax + Pmax.
3. The long term average admission rate achieved by our control scheme is within (B + C)/V of
the optimal value: lim infT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0
∑K
i=1 θiE{Ri(t)} ≥
∑K
i=1 θir
∗
i −
B+C
V
, where B and C are
constants, and ~r∗ = (r∗1 , . . . , r∗K) is the optimal admission rate vector.
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Proof : The proof follows standard steps under the stochastic optimization framework [18] [19]. The
optimal admission rate vector ~r∗ = (r∗1 , . . . , r∗K) can in principle be achieved by the simple backlog-
independent admission control algorithm. Thus,
E{Ri(t)|Q(t)} = E{Ri(t)} = r
∗
i ,
E{Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)|Q(t)} = E{Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)} ≥ r
∗
i ,
E{P (t)|Q(t)} = E{P (t)} ≤ Pav.
Substitute three inequalities into the following right hand sides terms,
Minimize∆(Q(t))
=E{L(Q(t+ 1))− L(Q(t))|Q(t)} + V E{
K∑
i=1
θiRi(t)|Q(t)} − V E{
K∑
i=1
θiRi(t)|Q(t)}
≤B + C + V E{
K∑
i=1
θiRi(t)|Q(t)} + E{
K∑
i=1
Ui(t)
(
Ri(t)−Rsi(t, P (t), ε(t), η)Ii(t)
)
|Q(t)}+
E{X(t)
(
P (t)− Pav
)
|Q(t)} − V E{
K∑
i=1
θiRi(t)|Q(t)}
≤B + C + V
K∑
i=1
θiE{Ri(t)|Q(t)} − V
K∑
i=1
θir
∗
i .
Therefore,
E[∆(Q(t))] =E{L
(
Q(t+ 1)
)
} − E{L
(
Q(t)
)
}
≤B + C + V
K∑
i=1
θiE{Ri(t)} − V
K∑
i=1
θir
∗
i .
Summing over t = 0, 1, 2, . . . T − 1, we have
E{L
(
Q(T )
)
} − E{L
(
Q(0)
)
} ≤ T (B + C) + V
T−1∑
t=0
K∑
i=1
θiE{Ri(t)} − V T
K∑
i=1
θir
∗
i .
It follows that
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
K∑
i=1
θiE{Ri(t)} ≥
K∑
i=1
θir
∗
i −
B + C
V
− E{L
(
Q(0)
)
}/TV
Thus, lim infT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0
∑K
i=1 θiE{Ri(t)} ≥
∑K
i=1 θir
∗
i −
B+C
V
.
Thus, when V becomes larger, the average admission rate is more close to the optimal value.
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V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present the performance of our control scheme by simulations. All the channels
are Rayleigh fading. θi = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. The selection set Π for total power P (t) is
{0, 100, 200, 300}, and the average power constraint Pav is 200. The selection set Λ for ratio ε(t) is
{0, 120 ,
2
20 ,
3
20 , . . . ,
19
20 , 1}.
A. Instantaneous Eavesdropping Channel Information
In Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), the system parameters for the simulation are NA=6, NE=3, and K=2.
Parameter V =5, 10, 20, and 100. The data arrival process for each user follows a binomial process with
average λ, which varies from 1 to 30. Fig. 4(a) shows that 1) For a fixed V , in the left part (i.e., the low
arrival rate region), the average admission rate is equal to the arrival rate. The reason is that when the
arrival rate is lower than the average secrecy channel capacity, all the arrival data are admitted into the
queue. When the arrival rate is larger than the average secrecy channel capacity, the average admission
rate is saturated with the increased arrival rate. For a fixed arrival rate, if parameter V increases, the
average admission rate is more close to the optimal value. 2) For fixed V and λ, the average admission
rate of the non-colluding case is higher than the one of the colluding case. Fig. 4(b) shows that 1) The
average queue length is increased with the increment of parameter V and arrival rate λ. 2) For fixed V
and λ, the average queue length in the non-colluding case is shorter than the one of the colluding case.
In Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), the system parameters are NE=3, K=2, and V =100. The data arrival
process for each user follows a binomial process with average λ = 30. The number of transmission
antennas NA=6, 8, 10, and 12. Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) show that 1) As the number of antennas increases,
the average admission rate is increased and the average queue length is correspondingly decreased for
both the non-colluding and colluding cases. 2) For the same number of antennas, the average admission
rate of the non-colluding case is higher than the one of the colluding case, but the average queue length
in the non-colluding case is shorter than the one in the colluding case.
B. Partial Eavesdropping Channel Information
In Fig 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), the system parameters for the simulation are NA=6, NE=3, K=2, and
η=0.1. Parameter V =5, 10, 20, and 100. The data arrival process for each user follows a binomial
process with average λ, which varies from 1 to 30. Fig. 6(a) shows that: 1) For a fixed V , in the left
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Fig. 4. In (a), average admission rate versus average arrival rate for both non-colluding and colluding cases in instantaneous
eavesdropping channel information scenario. In (b), average queue length versus average arrival rate for both non-colluding and
colluding cases in instantaneous eavesdropping channel information scenario.
part (i.e., the low arrival rate region), the average admission rate is equal to the arrival rate. The reason
is that when the arrival rate is lower than the average secrecy channel capacity, all the arrival data are
admitted into the queue. When the arrival rate is larger than the average secrecy channel capacity, the
average admission rate is saturated with the increased arrival rate. For a fixed arrival rate, if parameter
V increases, the average admission rate is more close to the optimal value. 2) For fixed V and λ, the
average admission rate of the non-colluding case is higher than the one of the colluding case. Fig. 6(b)
shows that: 1) The average queue length is increased with the increment of parameter V and arrival
rate λ. 2) For fixed V and λ, the average queue length in the non-colluding case is shorter than the one
in the colluding case.
In Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b), the system parameters are NA=6, NE=3, K=2, and V =100. The data
arrival process for each user follows a binomial process with average λ = 30. The secrecy outage
probability η=0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5. Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) show that 1) For both non-colluding and
colluding cases, when the secrecy requirement is loose (i.e., the secrecy outage probability η becomes
larger), the average admission rate is increased and the average queue length is correspondingly reduced.
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Fig. 5. In (a), average admission rate versus number of antennas for both non-colluding and colluding cases in instantaneous
eavesdropping channel information scenario. In (b), average queue length versus number of antennas for both non-colluding and
colluding cases in instantaneous eavesdropping channel information scenario.
2) For the same secrecy outage η, the average admission rate of the non-colluding case is higher than
the one of the colluding case, but the average queue length in the non-colluding case is shorter than
the one in the colluding case.
In Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b), the system parameters are NE=3, K=2, V =100, and η=0.1. The data
arrival process for each user follows a binomial process with average λ = 30. The number of transmission
antennas NA=6, 8, 10, and 12. Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) show that 1) As the number of antennas increases,
the average admission rate is increased and the average queue length is correspondingly decreased for
both the non-colluding and colluding cases. 2) For the same number of antennas, the average admission
rate of the non-colluding case is higher than the one of the colluding case, but the average queue length
in the non-colluding case is shorter than the one in the colluding case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the cross-layer resource allocation problem for the multi-user secure
communication system in both the sender having instantaneous and partial eavesdropping channel
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Fig. 6. In (a), average admission rate versus average arrival rate for both non-colluding and colluding cases in partial
eavesdropping channel information scenario. In (b), average queue length versus average arrival rate for both non-colluding and
colluding cases in partial eavesdropping channel information scenario.
information scenarios. In each scenario, for both non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping cases,
we designed admission controller based on the information in the upper layer and power controller with
the information from physical layer and upper layer. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of our
scheme.
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